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MINNESOTA'S FIRST STATE SUPREME COURT (18581865), AND THE INTRODUCTION OF THE
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
By NAHMAN SCHOCHET*

O

Of the greatest benefits a new state can enjoy is a supreme
court which in its first years adopts and correctly lays down
the rules of the common law, selecting, where these rules conflict,
those which experience has shown to be sound and those which
are best fitted to the people of the state.' Minnesota may be listed
as one such fortunate state. Minnesota was fortunate in that the
foundations of her jurisprudence were laid down by such men as
Emmett, Atwater, and Flandrau,--"men of the people, familiar
with their struggles, in sympathy with their aspirations, and yet
instructed in the mistakes of the past and in the principles whereby
like errors could be shunned."2 Minnesota's early judges were,
without exception, men of character, ability, and adequate learning
in the law.3 Their good work has prevented much injustice, uncertainty in the decisions of the courts, and has minimized unnecessary litigation and legislation.
This paper deals with Minnesota's first state supreme court,
1858 to 1865, treating the personal background as well as some
phases of the court's legal work. The judges sketched are Chief
justice Lafayette Emmett, Associate Justice Isaac Atwater, and
Associate Justice Charles Eugene Flandrau.
The development of civil procedure is also traced, starting with
the territorial practice, through 1866, by which time Minnesota had
installed a civil practice patterned after the New York Code of
Procedure of 1848.
NE
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS OF 1857
On February 26, 1857, the national Congress passed "An act to
authorize the people of the Territory of Minnesota to form a
constitution and state government, preparatory to their admission
into the Union on an equal footing with the original states." In
accordance with the provisions of this enabling act and an act
passed by the territorial legislature in its special session that spring,
the election of members for a constitutional convention was held
on June 1, 1857.4
Of these delegates, the majority belonged to the newly organized Republican party.5 As the election returns were not properly
canvassed, it was impossible to ascertain the popular majority.
The Democrats claimed to have received a popular majority of
over 1600 votes throughout the territory.0 This may have been
possible, since the Democrats were strong in the large towns,
where a high percentage of the voters participated, while the
Republicans were strong in the agricultural districts, where the
vote cast was much lighter. Fifty-eight Republicans received certificates of election, as contrasted with only fifty Democrats. In
the convention meetings, the Republicans had fifty-nine delegates,
and the Democrats had fifty-five members. 7 Owing to the irregularities of the election, many seats were disputed, and both parties
planned to capture the organization of the convention.
On July 13, 1857, the delegates met at the specified place, the
hall of the house of representatives. C. L. Chase, a Democrat,
and J. W. North, a Republican delegate, proceeded simultaneously
to call the convention to order. While the Republicans managed
to elect a temporary president, the Democrats moved to adjourn
and acted accordingly.s The Republicans remained in session the
first day. At noon of the next day, July 14, Secretary Chase
appeared at the entrance to the hall, and demanded possession of
the hall "for the use of the constitutional convention." Balcombe,
president of the Republican body, refused, answering that that
body was already in possession of the hall. Some Democrat then
moved that they use the council chamber, which was in the west

4

Minn. Laws, extra sess. 1857, ch. 99.
sNeill, History of Minnesota 626.
ISmith, Minn. Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention
17. (Democratic Wing).
7
Anderson and Lobb, History of the Constitution of Minnesota
75. 8
Moran, 8 Minn. Hist. Soc. Col. 168.
gDemocratic bebates 3-4; Andrews Republican Debates 28.
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end of the old capitol building. There the Democrats organized,
under the presidency of H. H. Sibley, and there they continued
to hold their meetings. Each of the two bodies claimed to be the
only legitimate constitutional convention, each denounced the other
as being responsible for the split, and each proceeded to draft a
separate constitution.
The difference in the personnel of the two bodies must be
noted. The majority of the Republican delegates were newcomers
in the territory, with very little experience in its governmental
affairs. The Democrats, on the other hand, had a large number
of delegates who were early arrivals in the territory, and had
considerable experience in public affairs. A number of the Democratic group were public officials, while there seemed to be none
among the Republicans. "The discussions in the Republican convention . . . showed that the members had less grasp of the
problems of state government as well as of methods of parliamentary procedure than had the Democrats."' 0
In a Minnesota supreme court decision of 1864, Chief Justice
Emmett wrote:
"The whole article on the judiciary, which was adopted by the
joint committee of the two conventions, and which now forms the
sixth article of the constitution, is, with the exception of the tenth
section, identical with that which was passed by the convention
over which Mr. Sibley presided; and we must look, therefore, to
the debates in this convention, rather than the other, for light
in regard to the meaning and intent of this article."'"
For this reason the work of the Democratic convention in regard to the supreme court will be emphasized more than that of
the Republican convention.
On July 29, the fourteenth day of the Democratic convention,
Sibley appointed committees to start work on the constitution.
The members of the committee upon the judicial department were
Sherburne, Meeker, Wait, Emmett, Flandrau, Day, and Burwell. 12 On August 10, the twenty-fourth day of the convention,
the committee submitted its report, which was signed by Sherburne, Meeker, Flandrau, Wait, and Burwell. The report provided for a supreme court of three judges, serving for seven year
terms, nominated by the governor, and appointed by him, by and
with the advice and consent of the senate.' 3 The report was
' 0Anderson and Lobb, op. cit. 89.
"'Crowell v. Lambert, (1864) 9 Minn. 292.
2Democratic Debates 119.
"Isbid. 489.
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tabled until August 14, when the convention resolved itself into
a committee of the whole on the judicial article. The one important action of the body on the supreme court was initiated by
Lafayette Emmett. Emmett moved to amend the article by striking out section 3 ("The Governor shall nominate, and by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint the
Supreme Judges, whose term of office shall be seven years"), and
substituting the following:
"The judges of the supreme court shall be elected by the
electors of the state at large, and their term of office shall be
4 seven
years and until their successors are elected and qualified.'
The section 3 in the report was a compromise section, and
because of its appointive feature, Emmett had not signed the report, while Flandrau had signed the report making exception to
this section and to one other. Emmett said:
"It was our intention to have submitted a minority report, but
owing to certain circumstances, we have not been able, to do so.
I think that the great principle of an elective judiciary will meet
the hearty concurrence of the people of this state, and that it will
be entirely unsafe to go before any people in this enlightened age
with a constitution which denies to them the right to elect all the
officers by whom they are to be governed."' 5
Flandrau supported him, saying:
"It has become the settled rule throughout the states which
have revised their constitutions within any recent date, to provide
for an elective judiciary."' 6
The supporters of an appointed judiciary stressed the independence of such a court from political parties. Emmett replied:
"We hear a great deal of talk about an independent judiciary.
What does it mean? Independent of whom? Independent of the
people? . . . If the people are incapable of selecting their judges,
they are also
incapable of selecting the man who is to appoint their
7
judges."'
The convention approved of Emmett's amendment, and
adopted it.8 The committee report provided a seven year term for
the supreme court judges. Some favored changing this to ten
years, and having the judges ineligible for re~lection. This amend14Ibid. 493.
15Ibid. 494.
26Ibid. 495.

17Ibid. 503.
sIt is interesting to note that the elective feature was adopted
mainly because of the work of Flandrau and Emmett, who were
later elected members of the first state supreme court.
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ment was rejected. Flandrau moved for a six year term, the
judges to be eligible for rehlection, but later withdrew this amendment. Chase suggested a six year term for the judges, one judge
to be elected every two years, "to secure Judges of different politics by having them chosen at different times."'19 Flandrau declared
himself in favor of Chase's amendment, while Emmett was opposed to it. The amendment was voted down. On August 15,
the report of the committee on the judiciary was adopted by the
convention, as amended.
Now let us turn to the Republican convention. On July 20,
President Balcombe appointed Wilson, Galbraith, Billings, North,
McClure, Stannard, and McCann, as the standing committee on
the judiciary department. Their report was submitted on August
5. On August 8, the convention resolved itself into a committee
of the whole upon the judiciary article. The report provided for
a supreme court of three judges, serving for nine years, one of
the judges to be elected every three years. No important amendment was added that effected any change in the structure or jurisdiction of the state supreme court. The article, as amended, was
adopted on August 21, 1857.20
On August 8, Moses. Sherburne brought before the Democratic
body a compromise resolution to unite the work of the two bodies.
After a heated debate the resolution was indefinitely postponed."
On August 10, Thomas J. Galbraith introduced a similar resolution in the Republican wing, which was adopted unanimously.
President Balcombe immediately appointed Galbraith, McClure,
Stannard, Aldrich, and Wilson, on the conference committee.2
Balcombe communicated with Sibley, informing him of the resolution adopted by the Republicans. Sibley presented the question to
the Democrats, who, on August 18, voted to have him appoint a
similar conference committee. Sibley named Gorman, Brown,
Holcombe, Sherburne, and Kingsbury, as constituting the Democratic committee..2 3 The conference committees started work immediately, on the afternoon of August 18. The result of their
long sessions was reported to the Democrats on August 27, and
adopted by them on August 28. The report was submitted to the
0

" Democratic Debates 115.

2
21ORepublican
fDemocratic
22
Republican
23

Debates 68, 69.
Debates 350-51.
Debates 410-11.
Democratic Debates 523.
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Republican body on August 28, and adopted on the same day."6
In this way one constitution, instead of two constitutions, was presented to the people of the territory for ratification. Two constitutions were prepared, of the same wording, one was signed
by fifty-one Democrats, and the other by fifty-three Republicans. 25
On October 13, 1857, the voters of the territory adopted the
constitution almost unanimously, 30,055 voting for it, and only
571 opposing it. On January 11, 1858, President Buchanan received a copy of the Minnesota constitution, and submitted it to
the senate. The bill for admission, after much delay, was finally
passed by both houses, and was signed by the president on May
11, 1858.28
The constitution, as adopted, provided for a state supreme
court of three justices, elected by the electors of the state at large,
and serving for seven years. The supreme court was given
"original jurisdiction in such remedial cases as may be prescribed
by law, and appellate jurisdiction in all cases, both in law and
equity. ' 27 Section 26 of article six ran in part: "The judges
.. . shall be men learned in the law."
With the exception of section 10 of article six, which provided for the governor appointing judges to complete unexpired
terms, the judiciary article was entirely the work of the Demo2s
cratic part of the convention.
"A perusal of the Republican plans for the judicial department
brings out clearly that the Republicans had no very consistent plan
of organization and that in many particulars what they proposed
was different from the scheme of judicial organization actually
adopted. . . . It was very clear that the Republicans had not
studied the problems of judicial administration as long and as
carefully as had some of the Democrats. It was, therefore, to be
expected that the2 compromise
committee would accept the Demo9
cratic proposals.
ELECTION OF THE FIRST SUPREME COURT JUDGES

Section 16 of the schedule -attached to the constitution provided for the submitting of the constitution to the electors on the
24Anderson and Lobb, op. cit. 98; Democratic Debates 597-615: Re-

publican
Debates 565-83.
25
Anderson and Lobb, op. cit. 276-77.
2GIbid. 133-38.
27Minn. Constitution Article 6, Sec. 2.

2
sCrowell
29

v. Lambert, (1864) 9 Minn. 283 (267).
Anderson and Lobb, op. cit. 122-23.
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second Tuesday in October, the thirteenth, at which time the
people were also to vote for state officers and congressional representatives.
The Democrats carried the election. Lafayette Emmett was
elected chief justice of the state supreme court, defeating Horace
R. Bigelow by 996 votes out of a combined total of 35,000 votes.
Isaac Atwater, with 18,199 votes, and Charles Eugene Flandrau,
who had 18,110 votes, defeated the Republican candidates Berry
and Billings for the positions of associate justices, the Republican candidates polling 17,052 and 17,026 votes respectively. Thus
Minnesota's first state supreme court consisted of three Democrats, Chief Justice Lafayette Emmett, and Associate Justices
Isaac Atwater and Charles Eugene Flandrau.3 °
It is interesting to note how the successful candidates werc
estimated. The following remarks are taken from the editorial
columns of the St. Paul Pioneer and Democrat for September 19,
1857.
"Mr. Lafayette Emmett, our candidate for chief justice, is
well known in this city, not more however, by his intellectual
qualities, than for his personal popularity, based upon those genial
and generous attributes which ever distinguish the true gentleman.
He is a ripe scholar, a studious lawyer, and a man against whose
integrity the tainted breath of slander has never been raised."
Concerning Atwater: "As a lawyer, he is known as one of the
most acute and well-read in Minnesota.

.

.

He is one of the

most vigorous writers in the Northwest, and we have .sufficient
professional pride to predict, that a man who makes as good an
editor as Mr. Atwater, will not certainly make an indifferent judge.
His election is certain. . . Mr. Flandrau is a young man, with
an old and a vise head. As a lawyer, he has few superiors in
Minnesota; and if elected, will add dignity and learning to our
supreme bench."
The same paper, perhaps the leading Democratic organ at the
time in the northwest, though bitterly criticising most of the Republican nominees, said: "For supreme judges, the Republicans
3
have nominated three very respectable candidates." '
LAFAYETTE EMMETT

Lafayette Emmett, the new chief justice, was born in Mount
Vernon, Ohio, on May 18, 1822. He was of Scotch-Irish deO~fficial results as determined by the canvassing board, see the St.
Paul Pioneer and Democrat, and the Daily Minnesotian, for Dec. 19, 1857.
3;'St. Paul Pioneer and Democrat, September 12, 1857.
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scent. His grandfather served in the revolutionary army tinder
General Morgan, and his father participated in the War of 1812.
under General Cowpers. Emmett early decided to make law his
life work; when seventeen, he entered the office of Columbus
Delano, later secretary of the interior. H'e was admitted to the
Ohio bar in 1843, and in 1846 was elected prosecuting attorney
for Knox county, serving for one year. In 1849 he married Miss
Elizabeth Ball, of Mount Vernon.
Soon after coming to Minnesota in 1851, Emmett opened a
law office in partnership with H. L. Moss; he continued to practice as a member of that firm until he was elected chief justice in
1857. From 1853 to 1858 Emmett was attorney-general of the
territory, being appointed by Governor Gorman.3 2 In the latter
half of the fifties he became recognized as one of the territory's
leading lawyers. Emmett excelled as a counsellor rather than as
an advocate in jury work; he was neither aggresive nor forceful,
but was always calm and self-possessed, deliberate and scholarly.
His uniform courtesy and most attractive personality made friends
of all with whom he came in contact. "PIe was a man of good
character, good education, and of exceptionally fine presence and
33
engaging manners."
Emmett was one of the most active members of the Democratic
constitutional convention in 1857, prominent in its debates, and
on several minor committees, as well as a member of the committee on the judicial department. Emmett was the one who prevailed upon the Democrats to provide for an elected rather than
an appointed judiciary. His work as attorney-general of the
territory, his engaging personality, and active partisan work made
him the logical candidate of the Democratic party for chief justice of the supreme court. He was recognised as a man of liberal
views, agreeable to his party, and respected by the people,-qnite
an ideal candidate.
On October 13, 1857, at the first state election, Emmett defeated the Republican candidate for chief justice. Emmett polled
18,169 votes, while H. R. Bigelow received 17,173 votes. Emmett thus became chief justice of Minnesota's first state supreme
court when thirty-five years old. He may be pictured as a slender, clean-shaven man, slightly above medium height; an "tindemonstrative, unassuming, but genial gentleman.""34
3213 Nat. Encyc. of Am. Biography 71.
3397 Minn. xvii.
341 Newson, Pen Pictures of St. Paul 330.

MINNESOTA'S FIRST STATE SUPREME COURT

101

For seven years after his judgeship, 1865-1872, Emmett practiced in the city of St. Paul. Records left of the time depict
him as a social entertainer rather than as a leading barrister. In
1872 he moved to Faribault, where a number of leading lawyers
resided, but did not do well there. His practice dwindled steadily,
and at times he seemed to be in dire need. In fact, at one time during his residence in Faribault, the other local members of the legal profession were about to gather a collection among themselves
for Emmett's benefit. That this was at all necessary, is surprising, for numerous other lawyers, less gifted and less likeable than
Emmett, were at that time building the foundations for sizable
fortunes which even today are the bases for family estates.
While in Faribault, Emmett ran for a state senatorship. Although
an Irishman, and very friendly, still the Irish vote in several of
the neighboring townships defeated him, electing his opponent,
judge T. S. Buckham.
In 1878 Emmett moved to Ortonville. No records can be
found of his activities here. But it may be conjectured that he
continued to follow the path of least resistance, inasmuch as he
was not heard of again as a lawyer of prominence. It would not
have taken very much effort on the part of a man as able as was
Lafayette Emmett, to have left a greater impression on Minnesota's legal history.
In 1885, Emmett moved to Las Vegas, New Mexico, where
one of his daughters married McGill Otero, then governor of
New Mexico. He died in Santa Fe, on August 11, 1906.
IsA~c ATwA-rmR

Isaac Atwater was born in Homer, Cortland county, New
York, on May 3, 1818. His parents were from Connecticut, and
were of English extraction. Isaac was the ninth of a family of
eleven children; raised upon his father's farm, it was expected
that he would follow farming. By the time he was sixteen he had
gained about all he could from the three months' winter terms at
the public school. He then prepared himself for college at Cazenovia, and at the Homer Academy, at the same time teaching to
obtain money for further studies. In 1840 he entered Yale College, graduating in 1844. Immediately thereafter he taught for
a year in Macon, Georgia, returning to study in the Yale Law
School for eighteen months.
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Atwater was admitted to the bar of New York City in 1847,
and started to practice in the following year. He was immediately successful, but suffered because of ill health; his physician
constantly advised him to seek a change of climate. In 1849 he
married Miss Permelia A. Sanborn, of Geddes, New York. In
the following year, 1850, they moved to Minnesota, settling in
St. Anthony Falls. For the following year Atwater was associated in a law office with John W. North; opening his own office in 1851. He was now also editor of the St. Anthony Express.
At that time Atwater was a Whig, and the Express strongly supported the Fillmore administration. "Mr. Atwater's able pen
. ..made the Express second in influence to no paper west of
Chicago.""

Atwater was on the first board of regents of the University
of Minnesota, being appointed by the territorial legislature in
1851. He was secretary of the board until 1857, when he resigned. In March of 1852, Governor Ramsey appointed him reporter of the decisions of the territorial supreme court, and in
the following year he was elected county attorney for Hennepin
county. His increasing professional business now forced him to
resign from his position as editor-in-chief of the St. Anthony
Express. In 1856 he left the Whig party and became affiliated
with the Democrats.3
In contrast with Emmett and Flandrau, Atwater was not a
Hie was, however,
member of the constitutional convention.
the
Democratic
candidates for
unanimously nominated as one of
associate justice in their nominating convention of September 15.
Of the three judges-elect, Atwater was the oldest, though
only thirty-nine when elected. He was acknowledged to be one
of the most prominent men in the state. He was a classic writer
and a ready speaker, an outstanding journalist as well as lawyer."
Before he was elected to the supreme bench, he had in the
course of business loaned many thousands of dollars for eastern
parties on landed security in Minnesota. The 1857 financial
panic destroyed all real estate values, and rendered the payment
of these loans an impossibility. As Atwater had not guaranteed
the loans, he was in no way responsible to the creditors. The
latter clamored for their money, and rather than have his judg35

Stevens, Personal Recollections 107.
S6Ibid. 292.
378 Magazine of Western History 254 on.
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ment criticised, the judge offered to allow them to select from
his private securities amounts equal to their claims, or to give
them his notes. They all accepted his notes, which left him with
very large outstanding obligations. At that time Nevada Territory was in bad need of experienced lawyers, and promised especially large returns for professional services. Friends of Atwater's informed him of conditions there, and asked him to
move. With the purpose of making money to meet his selfassumed obligations, Atwater resigned from the state supreme
court in 1865, and moved to Carson City, Nevada. Meeting with
immediate success, he wrote to Flandrau, asking the latter to join
him in Nevada, and Flandran also resigned and moved there.
After two and a half years, Atwater was able to pay off all of
his notes. His goal for settling in Nevada gained, he then returned to Minnesota.
In 1867 he was again joined by Flandrau, and for four years
they practiced as "Atwater and Flandrau." Late in 1870, Flandrau moved to St. Paul, and Atwater devoted himself largely to
public affairs of a municipal and educational character. He was
president of the local board of trade for two terms, on the city
council for several years, two years as president of that body,
and he was also president of the board of education. He was very
active in religious affairs. He also helped, develop the railroad
system of Minneapolis.
In 1884 he was compelled to leave his professional business,
because of his many private interests, and the firm was headed
by his son, John B. Atwater. He continued his public work until
his death. In 1892 he completed his two volume work "The History of Minneapolis," and contributed frequently to magazines
and newspapers. He died in Minneapolis, on December 22, 1906,
one of the last of the generation that founded the commonwealth
of Minnesota.
CHARLES EUGENE FLANDRAU

Charles Eugene Flandrau, the third of the new supreme court
justices, was the youngest and most adventurous of the three.
He was born in New York City, on July 15, 1828. He was descended on his father's side from the Huguenots; his paternal
ancestors founded the colony of New Rochelle, in New York.
His father, Thomas H. Flandrau, was a lawyer of prominence.
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His mother, Elizabeth Macomb, was a half-sister of General
Alexander Macomb, who was at one time commander-in-chief
of the United States army.
Flandrau was started in the public schools of Georgetown, in
the District of Columbia. When thirteen years old, he left school
and shipped as a common seaman on a United States revenue
cutter, and made several voyages on merchant vessels during the
next two years. He returned to Georgetown, but only for a short
while, this time going to New York City, where he worked for
three years sawing mahogany veneers for cabinets. After this
excursion he studied law in his father's office in Whitesboro, New
York. Here he received a thorough legal training. The elder
Flandrau was a graduate of Hamilton College, had practiced for
many years with Aaron Burr, and was admirably equipped to give
his son a good legal training. Charles Flandrau was admitted to
the bar in 1851, practicing with his father for the next two years.
In 1853, he and his friend Horace R. Bigelow, left New York
for the west, coming to Minnesota in November of that year.
The two men opened a law office in St. Paul. As their practice
was not particularly remunerative, they left their office, Bigelow
teaching school in St. Paul, while Flandrau left for the border,
settling at Traverse des Sioux, at that time the only settlement
in the Minnesota Valley. Flandrau spent that season in exploring the valley and negotiating for the purchase of lands for a
group of St. Paul capitalists. For a while following, he was in
an office there with Stewart B. Garvice. Flandrau told the story
that at that time they engaged in the unusual practice of "attracting the wolf" to their door. Bounties were paid for wolves,
and the two men made this profitable by placing a dead pony within easy range of the window of the hut which served as their
law office, and they would shoot the wolves as they approached
the body of the pony.
For a time, Flandrau held the office of clerk and district attorney for Nicollet county. He was deputy clerk of the federal
district court and notary public in 1854, and a member of the
territorial council in 1855, resigning before the term ended.
In
1856 President Pierce appointed him Indian Agent for the Sioux,
which position he held until he became associate justice of the
territorial supreme court in July of 1857, being appointed by
President Buchanan. Only one general session was held during
Flandrau's term, and he wrote no opinions for the court. He
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held several terms of the district court, and became noted for the
rapidity with which he despatched business. s
He was a delegate to the constitutional convention of that
year, sitting with the Democratic group, and taking a leading
part in the discussions and activities of that body. He was a
member of the committee on the judiciary, as well as several
minor ones. At the Democratic nominating convention in September, Flandrau .vas chosen as a candidate for an associatejudgeship, and was successful.
Only twenty-nine years old when elected, he was the youngest
of the judges. Although young, he had filled high offices of public trust successfully, and was well known, especially throughout
the Minnesota valley. Nevson describes him as a "tall, slender,
sinewy, dignified, courteous, energetic, polished gentleman, more
like a military officer than a civilian." He was well-learned in
the law, convincing in his arguments, and an excellent speaker,"a first-class lawyer and a first-class man."39
During his term as judge, in the Indian outbreak of 1862, he
played a prominent part in the defence of New Ulm, and so wrote
his name indelibly in Minnesota's military history.
After retiring from the state supreme court in 1865, he accepted Atwater's offer to join him in his practice at Carson City,
and Virginia City, Nevada. After about one year in Nevada,
Flandrau went to Washington on business for the firm. He intended to return to Nevada, because their practice there was already well established and very satisfactory. His family, however, objected to the hardships of frontier life, and in 1866 he
entered into a law partnership with Colonel Musser, in St. Louis.
St. Louis did not satisfy Flandrau, who found the region too
dull. Meanwhile Atwater had returned to Minnesota, practicing
in Minneapolis, and invited Flandrau to join him again, so Flandrau returned to Minnesota before long, joining Atwater again
in 1867. That same year Flandrau was elected city attorney of
Minneapolis, and in 1868 was named the first president of the
local board of trade. In 1870 he returned to St. Paul, and remained in that city thereafter. The membership of the firm he
joined, Bigelow and Clark, changed occasionally, but it was firmly established as a leading office.
381 Encyc. of Biography of Minn. 187 on; 7 Magazine of Western
History 655 on.
391 Newson, Pen Pictures of St. Paul 406.
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Several times, Flandrau accepted the Democratic nomination
for several state offices. He knew that he would not be elected,
but accepted because of his intense party loyalty. It may be noted
that his interest and industry aided greatly in preserving the story
of Minnesota's early years. He issued a large work treating of
Minnesota's history, and a smaller volume, called "The History
of Minnesota and Tales of the Frontier." He also contributed
a number of important papers to the Minnesota Historical Society's collections. He died in St. Paul, on July 15, 1903, his
seventy-fifth birthday, leaving a notable record as statesman,
jurist, author, and military commander.
COMPARATIVE WORK OF THE JUDGES

The opinions in cases that came before Minnesota's first state
supreme court fill eight volumes, volumes 2 through 9 of the Minnesota reports.
The total number of majority opinions is 504.
Chief Justice Emmett wrote 125 majority opinions, or approximately one fourth of the total. Associate Justice Atwater wrote
161 majority opinions, or approximately one third. Associate
Justice Flandrau wrote 218 majority opinions, or 43 per cent.4"
The cases that came before this court can be divided quite
equally into two sections: the first four volumes, 2 through 5,
and the second four volumes, 6 through 9. In volumes 2 through
5 there are 257 majority opinions. Of these, Chief Justice Emmett
wrote 60 opinions, or 23 per cent; Associate Justice Atwater wrote
75, or 29 per cent; and Associate Justice Flandrau wrote 122, or
48 per cent of the total. There were 38 dissenting votes in these
first 257 cases, approximately one for every seven cases. Emmett
dissented 33 times, 30 times without written reasons; Atwater
dissented 3 times, twice without written reasons; and Flandrau
dissented twice, with a written dissenting opinion for one of these
two cases. There were 10 supporting opinions (same decision
but different reasoning) : 3 by the chief justice, 2 by Atwater,
and 5 by Flandrau.
Seventy-five, or 30 per cent of the opinions in the first four
volumes (2 through 5) were without any citations or references
of any kind to commentaries, texts, dictionaries, or judicial opinions of any court. Of these 75 opinions without citations, Em40
1n 97 Minn. xxxI, the following figures are given: Emmett 124; Atwater, 158; Flandrau, 217; with a total of 499 opinions for these three
judges.
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mett wrote 34, Atwater wrote 12, and 29 were written by Flandrau. Forty-three opinions, or one out of every six, contained
references only to previous decisions of the same court; 11 in
this group were from the pen of the chief justice, 7 by Associate
Justice Atwater, and Associate Justice Flandrau wrote 25 such
opinions. Each judge wrote one opinion which included a reference only to decisions of the Minnesota territorial supreme court.
In 9 cases, or approximately one out of every thirty, one of the
judges did not sit: Emmett. six times; Atwater, twice; and
Flandrau once.
Carrying this statistical analysis into the second group of
volumes of opinions written by this court; volumes 6 through 9
contain 247 majority opinions written by Justices Emmett, Atwater, and Flandrau. The chief justice wrote 65 opinions, or 26
per cent; Atwater wrote 86 opinions, or 35 per cent; and Flandrau wrote 96 opinions, or 39 per cent of the majority opinions
in the second half of the court's work. There were only 8 dissenting votes in this group; three by Emmett (one without written reasons), three by Atwater, and two by Flandrau. One supporting opinion, written by Flandrau, is included in these volumes.
Fifty-eight, or 23 per cent of the opinions in the last four volumes were written without the inclusion of any citations or references: 26 by Emmett, 16 by Atwater, and 16 by Flandrau.
Sixty-five opinions, or one out of every four, contained citations
exclusively from previous decisions of the same court.
Returning to the figures based upon all of the cases, it seems
clear that the work of writing the opinions was rather unevenly
divided between the judges (majority opinions total 504: Emmett wrote 125, Atwater 161, and Flandrau 218). In volume 1,
Associate Justice Flandrau wrote 25 out of the 47 opinions. Of
the 65 opinions contained in volume 3, Flandrau wrote 34. In
volume 4, the same judge wrote 39 out of the 79 opinions in that
volume. Only in volume.9 does Flandrau's total appear to be
smaller than his fair share, but there the appearance is deceiving,
as both he and Atwater did not finish their terms. 41 Flandrau's
smallest comparative contribution toward the opinions in any of
4XIn volume 9, the opinions were written as follows: Emmett 16:
Atwater, 11; Flandrau, 10; Wilson, 7; McMillan, 9. Judges Wilson and
McMillan finished the terms of Judges Atwater and Flandrau, and continued to serve in the next court. Their records would be more properly
studied in connection with a survey of the succeeding court, and are
therefore not taken up here.
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the volumes (excluding volume 9), is in volume 7, where he
wrote 25 out of 68 opinions. Throughout his term Flandrau did
more than his share of this part of the court's work. Of the 505
opinions here considered, Chief Justice Emmett and Associate
Justice Atwater together wrote 286, while Associate Justice Flandrau alone wrote 218 majority opinions.
Associate Justice Atwater travelled the middle road, averaging 32 per cent of the opinions. His lowest average (excluding
volume 9), is in volume 3, where he wrote one out of every four
cases, or 17 out of 65. His highest comparative number of opinions is found in volume 8, where he wrote 39 per cent of the
cases, or 33 out of 85.
The chief justice, Lafayette Emmett, wrote the smallest number of majority opinions. In volume 2 he wrote only 8 out of
47 opinions, or approximately one out of every six. His best
record (excluding volume 9), is in volume 5, where he wrote the
opinions for 19 out of 66 cases, or 29 per cent of the total nuniber of majority opinions contained in that volume.
THE CIrATIONS USED

1858-1866

To examine the citations employed by our present state supreme court, to discover the main sources of their practice, would
very likely have but little meaning. For today, at least as compared with seventy years ago, -thegreater part of questions of law
have been worked out. Citations for present day decisions might
very well come from a number of different jurisdictions. But
the situation in the first years of Minnesota's statehood was very
different. At that time the code of procedure had but recently
been adopted, and pleading and practice were in a transitional
state. The lawyers of the period had been trained in different
states, and each of the older states had its own precedents and
line of decisions. These were often conflicting, and Minnesota
had as yet uniformly followed none of them. The territorial
bench had not left a systematic body of precedents to be followed
by succeeding courts. A beginning had to be made in establishing precedents for the cases presented, and some older systems
followed, at least in part. In many cases it was of more importance that the law be definitely settled than examining the principles
adopted in settling it.42
42

Atwater, 7 Magazine of Western History

659.
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"The state was new; the administration of justice was in
rather a chaotic condition, and many of the important constitu-

tional questions that came before the court for decision had to be
determined upon first impression and without guiding precedent,
which rendered the duties of the judges difficult and unusually
important.""4
Although we received our early practice largely from Wisconsin, after the adoption of the code of procedure in 1853, we had
to look to New York for guidance in the new system of civil

pleading and practice. Until 1848, when Wisconsin became a
state, Minnesota had been part of Wisconsin territory. But when
the code was adopted in 1853, New York practice and rules had to
be referred to, as Wisconsin did not adopt the newer system until
some time later. Thus it was that in a majority of the questions
presented to the supreme court for settlement in connection with
the new system, for which statutes provided only the bare outlines, Minnesota had no precedents in point to refer to."4 This
may be seen more clearly by reference to the state of New York,
where almost every session of the state legislature resulted in
additions to, and elaborations of the first statutes introducing code
pleading. In view of these facts, considerable importance may be
placed tipon Minnesota's dependence upon outside courts and
practices, and this can be traced through several different procedures: (1) tracing the citations and references in the court's
opinions, (2) determining the practice prior to and during the
first years of Minnesota's statehood, (3) investigating the character of the population, and more especially, the leaders of the
legal profession, (4) seeing which state's practice (if any) the
legislature followed in framing the judicial statutes, (5) considering where the supreme court judges received their training, and
more especially, those judges who were most active in the court's
work.
As noted elsewhere, 133 opinions, or 26 per cent of all of the
opinions written by Judges Emmett, Atwater, and Flandrau, were
without any citations or references to commentaries, texts, dictionaries, or judicial opinions of any court. This is a considerable proportion, one fourth of the cases apparently decided without definite references to previous practices of their own court or
any other court. This may be construed a number of different
43

Flandrau, 8 Magazine of Western History 258.
44From interviews with Judge T. S. Buckham, who practiced before
the state supreme court in this period.
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ways: it may be interpreted as showing the lack of a good reference library, as indicating the independence of the court, or as
showing the necessity that then existed for introducing a new
practice better adapted to the needs of a new middle-western
state.
The total number of citations in the opinions of the court is
2677, coming from 269 different sources, which fall into 36 groups.
The group classification, with the number of sources in each group,
is as follows: Alabama, 1; Arkansas, 1; California, 1; Connecticut, 2; Florida, 1; Illinois, 3; Indiana, 4; Kentucky, 6; Louisiana, 2; Maine, 2; Maryland, 5; New Hampshire, 2; New Jersey,
2; North Carolina, 5; New York, 25; Ohio, 2; Pennsylvania, 6;
South Carolina, 5; Tennessee, 3; Texas, 2; Virginia, 3; Vermont,
1; Wisconsin, 2; Minnesota, 2; United States (including commentaries federal in scope), 50; England, 111; texts or commentaries, 50; dictionaries (4 law), 5; bible, 1; France, 1; Ireland,
2; Roman, 1.
The above figures are based upon the number of sources, but
are not an accurate guide, because each reporter is listed as a
separate source. The totals of the actual references to the state
reports and other sources follow: Alabama, 8; Arkansas, 3;
California, 10; Connecticut, 29; Florida, 1; Illinois, 10; Indiana,
8; Kentucky, 28; Louisiana, 1; Maine, 20; Maryland, 14; Michigan, 6; Missouri, 16; Massachusetts, 86; New Hampshire, 9;
New Jersey, 2; North Carolina, 14; Ohio, 10; Pennsylvania, 53;
South Carolina, 11; Tennessee, 7; Virginia, 5; Vermont, 15;
Wisconsin, 11; Minnesota, 404; New York, 1089; England, 381;
United States, 366; dictionaries, 18.
First, let us note the foreign references. There is one lone
reference to the Bible; Associate Justice Flandrau, in the well
known case of Mason v. Callender,4 starts his historical treatment
of the question with a reference to the rule concerning usury stated
in Deuteronomy. The same opinion contains also a reference to
the Irish volume, Schoales and Lefroy. *0 In the case of St. Paid
v. Kuby, 47 Atwater referred to a French source, Pothier's Obligations. The reference to Clancy's Rights of Married Women, an
Irish volume, was in the opinion for Tullis v. Fridley,*8 written by
45(1858) 2 Minn. 350.
6

4 Selby v. Stanley, (1860) 4
47(1863) 8 Minn. 154, 169.

48(1864) 9 Minn. 79, 83.

Minn.

65, 70.
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Flandrau. The Roman reference was a citation of a rule from
Justinian's Digest, by Flandrau, in Filley v. Register."
Citations were made from the opinions of 26 other states of the
Union, with 96 separate sources. Twenty-five of these sources
were from New York, slightly over one fourth of the total. One
out of every eighteen cases contained references only to New York
practice and rules; 41 per cent of all of the citations were from
New York. The four states referred to most frequently besides
New York and Minnesota, were Massachusetts, with 86 references,
or 3 per cent of the total; Pennsylvania, with 53 citations, or 2
per cent of the total; and Connecticut, with 29, and Kentucky with
28 references, each being 1 per cent of the total. The remaining
state references, as may be seen above, were well scattered among
the other states, and may be considered as of little consequence in
comparison with the mich greater dependence upon the New York
practice and decisions.
Three hundred and fifty-six of the 2677 citations were from
federal court decisions or from commentaries which were federal
in their scope; 381 citations were from English authorities. While
there was a total of 111 separate English sources, the United
States works numbered 50. The English references were used
mainly for questions of common law rules, and in the historical
treatment given many of the questions at issue. Thirteen per
cent of the citations were from United States authorities, and 14
per cent from English works.
Fifteen per cent of the total, or 404 of the 2677 citations, were
from Minnesota; only 3 being citations from the one volume of
decisions of the Minnesota territorial supreme court, with the rest
consisting of references to previous decisions of the same men in
Minnesota's first state supreme court.
The four leading sources for the court's references were (1)
New York, (2) Minnesota, (3) England, (4) the United States
(including commentaries federal in their nature). These four
have a total of 2240 of the 2677 citations; 83 per cent of the
court's references were to these four groups.
The table below shows the relative number of references to
these four leading groups:
49(1860) 4 Minn. 391, 396.
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Volume, with
no. of cits.

2-316
3-369
4-510
5-333
6-431
7-194
8-277
9-247
2677

New York

187, 59%
152, 41%
166. 32%
151, 45%
187, 41%
60, 30%
86, 31%
100. 40%
1089, 41%

Minn.

9, 2.8%
41, 11%
59, 11%
47, 14%
57. 13%
77, 40%
73, 26%
41. 16%
404, 15%

England

42, 13%
44, 12%
115, 22%
30, 9%
60, 14%
14, 7%
34, 12%
45, 18%
381, 14%

United States

Total

41,
46,
67,
64,
58,
26,
32,
32,
366,

88%
76%
78%
87%
81%
91%
81%
87%
83%

13%
127
13%
19%
13%
14%
12%
13%
13% 2240,

In each volume, excepting number 7, the New York references
are more numerous than those in any other group. In four
volumes, numbers 2, 3, 5, and 6, the New York citations outnumber
the totals of the other groups in the above table. The New York
references occur less frequently in the last four volumes, while
the Minnesota citations appear more often there than in the first

four volumes.

Both the English and the United States references

appear less frequently in the last four volumes than in the first
four, and in approximately the same ratio. The proportion of
the New York references is impressive, 4 out of every 10, with
one opinion in every 18 containing only New York references.
PRACTIcE
The American colonies, after their secession from England in
1776, naturally continued their legal practice as before, following
the English common law and chancery proceedings and practice.
This system of procedure was adopted here as it was at the time
of the secession. Important changes and modifications later introduced in England had no direct effect in this country. The demands for reform in common law and chancery practice in England resulted in important changes there in the years 1828 and
1833. These changes did call the attention of our legal profession
to the need for reforms in our practice, especially as the' new
English modifications were not sufficient to meet the situation.
The English changes were not adopted in this country, but increasing attention was drawn to the fact that the technicalities of common law pleading were out of due proportion to their value.
The most important objections to the old system were these:"
1. It involved an arbitrary and useless distinction between the
actions at law and suits in equity;
5OSunderland, Cases on Code Pleading 14.
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2. the forms of actions, such as trespass, trover and assumpsit,
were surviving remnants of an outgrown system of writs, and the
rules which defined their character and scope were technical and
largely useless.
3. the formal language of the pleadings tended to obscure
rather than disclose the real issues;
4. failure to distinguish clearly between the parties;
5. the technical distinctions between the different kinds of
pleas, and the formal requirements in regard to them, were extremely burdensome and frequently resulted in a miscarriage of
justice;
6. limitations upon the right to join different causes of actions
in the same declaration, and restrictions upon the right to set-off
demands, multiplied litigation without any compensating advantages;
7. the strict rules of construction applied to pleadings encouraged technical objections, and often obscured the merits of causes;
8. the system was productive of confusion through the common
use of fictions and untrue allegations;
9. by means of broad general issues defendants were enabled
to conceal their real defenses;
10. amendments to pleadings were not permitted with sufficient
liberality.
In attempting to avoid these serious defects of the old system
of procedure, a new system of pleading and practice was devised,
called "code pleading." This system, first introduced in the state
of New York, in 1848, has since been followed by the majority
of the states.
The term "code" is used in several ways in different jurisdictions. Generally, it is any systematic codification of the statutes
on a certain subject. A number of states have collected all of their
outstanding and unrepealed legislation into "codes." But used
in a narrower sense, as in this paper, the term means a statute or
group of statutes affecting the subject of pleading, either a transcript, or a modification of the New York code of procedure.
The main features of code pleading, even as practiced today,
are embodied in the Field Code of 1848, or as it is more often
named, the New York Code of Procedure Act of 1848. The
original statute, containing 391 sections, was passed April 12, 1848,
and became operative on July 1, 1848. Amended on May 1, 1849,
it was still labelled as the "1848 code." Another statute of the
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New York State Legislature, approved on July 10, 1851, and
going into operation on July 30, 1851, altered the wording of a
majority of the sections, and added new ones, to a total of 473
sections. Minor and comparatively unimportant changes were introduced in 1852 and in following years, but for the basis of our
comparison, in the period covered by this paper, no important
changes were effected.
The important changes effected by the code system, from the
original New York statute, were three: (1) the abolition of the
distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and of the
forms of legal actions; (2) the use of the equitable, instead of the
legal theory of parties; (3) a simplification of the general rules of
pleading, allowing a union of causes of action in -the same complaint or petition, a more simple manner of stating the cause of
action, and changes in regard to denial, new matter, and counterclaims. These new rules applied to all actions, now termed "civil
actions," and were, so far as practicable, an adaptation of the
equitable rather than the legal rules and principles, especially in
reference to the parties, the pleadings, and to the form and character of the judgment. These fundamental principles are practically
the same in all code jurisdictions, although there are endless varieties of detail in matters of practice. "In adjudicating upon these
most important matters, the courts of the various Code states have,
with a remarkable unanimity, substantially reached the same conclusions." 51
From 1836 until 1848, when Wisconsin became a state, Minnesota had been a part of Wisconsin territory. The practice of
that period was that of the common law and chancery systems, as
derived from England, modified in some respects by statutes and
rules of the courts. Wisconsin became a state in 1848, and in
1849 Minnesota was declared a separate territory. The common
law practice continued, with the addition of such statutes and
rules as were needed for better adaptation to the local conditions.r,

In 1849, the territorial legislative assembly of Minnesota passed
a bill providing for the preparation of a code of laws for the territory. Governor Ramsey, however, disapproved of the bill on
grounds of economy, thinking that too many commissioners were
provided for, and the matter was dropped for the time. 3
5iPomeroy, Remedies and Remedial Rights, 2nd Ed. 27.
521 Shipman, Civil Procedure-Minnesota 2.
53
Minn. Territory, 1849 House Journal 61, 124, 170.
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In 1850, the acts of the first legislative assembly were published. The volume included those important general laws of
Wisconsin which were in force in Minnesota territory by provision
of the organic act.
In his 1851 message, Governor Ramsey recommended a revision of the laws. The assembly passed a joint resolution authorising the joint judiciary committee of the two houses to appoint
several commissioners to revise and compile the laws. Three commissioners were appointed, L. A. Babcock, William Holcombe, and
M. S. Wilkinson. They were handicapped in their work, and not
all of them could work together all of the time, but they finished
their work in time to have it acted upon by the same legislature.
Their work was carefully considered by the assembly, approved
by them, and received the approval of the governor on March 31,
1851. These revised statutes of 1851 include the basis of our
code. Section 1, page 330, reads:
"The'distinction between the forms of actions at law, heretofore
existing, are abolished; and there shall be in this territory hereafter, but one form of action at law, to be called a civil action,
for the enforcement or protection of private rights, and the redress
of private wrongs, except as otherwise expressly provided by this
statute."
Thus the distinctions betveen the actions at common law were
abolished, and the "civil action" introduced as the one form for a
civil legal action; chancery suits were still distinguished from
actions at law. An editorial comment of two years later, perhaps
the only local editorial comment on this important chnge, read :5'
"When we reflect that our entire code was compiled and perfected during that session (1851), under many disadvantages,
arising from a want of copies of the statutes of other states, and
the difficulty of adapting the laws of a state densely populated, to
suit the wants of our sparsely settled Territory, we have reason
to be highly gratified, yes, proud of the legal attainments of the
committee more especially charged with the revision."
The one important change left was to abolish the distinctions
between chancery proceedings and actions at law. To this effect,
a bill was introduced before the council, by Babcock, on February
7, 1853. The bill, approved on March 5, 1853, was entitled: "An
Act to authorize the exercise of all equity jurisdiction in the form
of civil actions, and for other purposes." 55 Section 1 of the act
reads:
5554 The Minn. Pioneer (St. Paul. Democratic) for March 10, 1853.
Minn. Territory, Statutes 1853, ch. 9.
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"Be it enacted by the Legislative Assembly of the Territory
of Minnesota, That all equity and chancery jurisdiction, authorized by the organic act of the Territory, shall be exercised, and
all suits or proceedings to be instituted for that purpose are to be
commenced, prosecuted, and conducted to a final decision and
judgment, by the like process, pleadings, trial, and proceedings, as
in civil actions."
Minor changes in some of the statutory specifications were of
course introduced at the succeeding sessions of the legislature. By
an act passed March 13; 1858, it was provided that Aaron Goodrich, Moses Sherburne, and William Hollinshead were appointed
commissioners to revise the statutes, and to report on a code of
practice for the state. Two separate reports were made relating
to the code of procedure, neither of which was adopted by the
legislature. In the joint resolution advising the commissioners
of the legislature's purpose and advice relating to a revision of the
code, we find this direction:

".

.

. and to prepare a system of

pleadings and practice for the several courts of this State, such
system to conform as near as practicable to the present New York
Code, and having reference to the brevity and legal intent of the
pleadings."50
In the majority report of the commission, the work of Slierburne and Hollinshead, we find this statement in the introduction:
"The commissioners were not called upon to speak of the
merits or demerits of the New York system of legal practice. It
is enough for them to say that it has obtained favor in this state,
to a greater or less extent, and that they were instructed to conform substantially to its provisions. These instructions have been
followed faithfully."
These two commissioners did state their position, however, as
advocating, if a change should be made, an entire change to a
modified common law practice.
The introduction to the dissenting report, written by Aaron
Goodrich, is most interesting, as expressing the frank opinion of
an experienced jurist of the period. In speaking of his own
report, he wrote:
"He has retained in this report the essential qualities of the
Code while attempting to free it from its most oppressive features.
He has sought to infuse into it some of the principles which in
other days guided the bar and bench in the pursuit of justice.
Neither of these reports come up to his appreciation of right. It
56Minn. Majority Report of the Commissioners on Pleading and Practice, 1858, preface.
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is yet too soon to hope for a return to the purer principles and
practice of the common law, yet that day will surely come. Its
advent will be hailed by the people of Minnesota with demonstra.tions of joy such as characterised the restoration of the 'law of
their fathers' to the ancient Britons, by the promulgation of Magna
Charta. This result must be produced by the wrongs which such
codification will ever entail."
Goodrich's main objection was to the accumulation of excessive
costs; this was remedied in great part by legislative action during
the next few years. He also included in his report under set-offs
what otherwise came under both set-offs and counter claims. His
other objections are difficult, if not impossible, to discover.
From a letter to Colonel John H. Stevens, from J. Severance,
dated July 15, 1858, more sidelight may be obtained on the reception of these reports. From the fact that neither report was accepted, or even modified, nor another and different report called
for, it seems reasonable to deduce that there was considerable difference of opinion. The letter reads, in great part :5"I received a few days since a copy of the report of practice
by Aaron Goodrich. and one by Hollinshead and Sherburne. and
I must say that neither system answers my expectations. With
the exception that Goodrich strikes out the fees of attorney, which
in my estimation is right, there is no material difference in the
reports, and I should naturally think they were drawn by the same
man. Both reports follow the New York practice very closely
and I cannot see where there is any material difference. I had a
conversation at Henderson with Mr. Hollinshead yesterday and
he says that the committee were in favor of some practice like the
Massachusetts practice, and why they did not present a report to
that effect is more than I can see. Hollinshead says that he
wrote to several prominent members of the New York bar before
he commenced his report, and they all spoke in terms of disfavour
of their own practice and are anxious for a new one. . . . At
present I am in favour of rejecting both reports and leave things
as they are until we can have something better."
When Goodrich's code was presented to the house, it was
passed without amendments. In the senate, on its final passage,
the vote stood 17 for, and 7 against. As the constitution required
a vote of 19 for in the senate for passage of bills, the report
58
failed.
In the next session of the state legislature, 1859-1860, an
attempt was made to revert to the common law system without
57
From Stevens' letters, Minnesota Historical Society Manuscript Department.
5sMinn. Senate Journal 1859-60, p. 172.
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any intermediate steps. On January 14, 1860, two motions to this
effect were introduced in the house of representatives. A Mr.
Hayes offered the following resolution: "Resolved, That the
Committee on the Judiciary be instructed to report a bill to this
House establishing the common law practice, with such modifications as may be deemed advisable, and repealing the so-called code
of practice." This resolution was approved by a vote of 47 to 14.
Next a Mr. Fox introduced a bill to this effect, titled: "A bill to
establish a common law practice in the State of Minnesota, and to
repeal the code now in force.' '5D This bill was referred to the
committee on the judiciary.
On January 24, 1860, the house adopted the following resolution, which was introduced by Mr. Fox :60
"Resolved, That Aaron Goodrich, James Smith and Lorenzo
Allis be appointed commissioners, to act in conjunction with the
judiciary committee, to report rules of practice for the government of the courts of this state, conformable to the common law
practice and pleadings, and that the said commissioners and committee be requested to reply to this House within eight days."
Meanwhile the committee on the judiciary had worked upon
the resolutions of January 14. The bill reported back by the
committee had been amended by the house, and returned to the
committee. It was finally passed by the house on February 18, 1860,
entitled: "An act to define the pleading and practice in this State."
In the senate, however, its fate was otherwise. Tabled, postponed
several times, it was finally tabled again, and heard of no more.
Even less is to be found concerning the code commissioners
and their work. Today, no trace of a report can be found. That
they did actually work upon a new code is indisputable, since the
session laws for 1860 include provisions for paying the three
commissioners appointed according to the house resolution of
January 24. 1860, for their work.6'
Undoubtedly, this agitation for a return to the common law
and chancery systems was caused chiefly by the activity of Aaron
Goodrich. He submitted a lengthy communication to that effect
to the legislature of 1860.621
59Minn. House Journal 1860, p. 270.
GObid. 320.
61Minn. Gen. Laws 1860, p. 208.
62
Minn. Senate Journal 1860, pp. 168 and ff.; Minn. House Journal
1860, pp. 217-24.
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Throughout this agitation for the abolition of the code system
of procedure, the system was being simplified by legislative acts,
and worked out in practice before the courts.
Judge Flindrau wrote the following of Goodrich :03
"Aaron Goodrich . . . was quite an eccentric person, and not
particularly eminent as a lawyer. . . . At one time Judge Good-

rich, Judge Chatfield, and William Hollinshead, were appointed
to compile the statutes from 1849 to 1858. Goodrich got up a
code of his own. It was not a compilation at all, but an original
code. . .

It got into print, but no further."

It readily can be seen that the practice of that period was
necessarily quite mixed. The New York code was a new system,
and a radical departure from the older system. "The older lawyers
were reluctant to learn its ways, even in its home in New York;
but when administered by judges from Tennessee, Pennsylvania,
Michigan, Maine, and Kentucky, all of whom were wedded to their
own way of doing things and thought they could not be improved
upon, the jumble was of course rather amusing.""
By an act of the legislature approved on February 17, 1863,
S. J. R. McMillan, E. P. Palmer, Thomas Wilson, and Andrew
G. Chatfield were appointed commissioners to revise the state
statutes, and were directed to submit a report at the 1864 session.
A. G. Chatfield declined to serve. The others started at once upon
their task. But because most of their time was necessarily occupied
by their judicial duties, and because of the magnitude of the undertaking, the work was not completed in the specified time. The
commission was continued by the legislature, and required to submit a printed report at the 1865 session. Again they were unable
to do so. In 1865 the membership of the commission was changed;
on February 2, G. E. Cole was added, and in July, McMillan and
Wilson were appointed to the supreme court, to complete the
terms of Atwater and Flandrau. In 1866 a report was finally
made, and accepted at the same session, and the 1866 revised
statutes were published that year.
There were no important changes effected in the code of practice. The phraseology was changed in a number of instances, and
minor amendments since the last revision were incorporated into
the proper sections.0 5
Minn. Hist. Soc. Col. 99.
4Flandrau, 8 Minn. Hist. Soc. Col. 100.
65Minn. Rev. St 1866, preface.
638
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CHARACTER OF THE POPULATION

The character of the population, especially of the professional
class, also shows a connection with New York. In the middle of
the nineteenth century, Minnesota was still considered as frontier
territory. Not until 1880 does it begin to be treated as settled
territory. In the fifties, Minnesota succeeded to the place formerly
held by Wisconsin, as a most desirable place for settlers.
A general study of the middle west region of that period would
most likely lead to the conclusion that the region was a meeting
place of northern, southern, and central states. In general, this was
also true of Minnesota. But in Minnesota there were also definite
connections with certain of the older states. Formerly the region
was segregated as the Mississippi valley region, with New Orleans
figuring as the chief outlet for middle western products. But the
later movement of eastern settlers, building up Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, and Minneapolis, replaced the dominance of the
southern element with that of a modified Puritan stock. The
early fifties brought a railroad system approaching the Mississippi
valley, which bound the region to the north Atlantic seaboard, and
New Orleans gave way to New York as the outlet for the middle
west. Railway construction and transportation stimulated interriver settlements. "The change in the political and social ideas
was at least equal to the change in economic connections, and together these forces made an intimate organic union between New
E-ngland, New York, and the newly settled West."00
As evidenced by the change in party control in 1859, the Democrats giving way to the Republicans, the control of the middle
west, including Minnesota, had by this time passed to settlers from
the northeastern states. The largest proportion of the Minnesota
settlers came from Wisconsin and from New York, 7 with a considerable number coming from Vermont. 8
As representative leaders in the legal profession in Minnesota
for that period, have been taken the thirty-five lawyers who conducted suits most frequently before the state supreme court between 1858 and 1866. Of these thirty-five, fifteen were trained
in New York: C. 1. Berry, H. R. Bigelow, J. B. Brisbin, C. D.
Gilfillan, James Gilfillan, Henry Hinds, G. L. Otis, I. Van Etten,
C. E. Vanderburgh, F. R. E. Cornell, I. V. D. Heard, D. C.
Cooley, H. F. Masterson, 0. Simons, and A. G. Chatfield. Prac66

Turner. The Frbntier in American History 27-28, 137.
07bid. 147, 237.
6iFrom interviews with Judge T. S. Buckham.
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tically all of these men practiced in New York after the adoption
there of the Field code of procedure. Only one of the group, G.
L. Otis, practiced in another state before coming to Minnesota.
Seven of these thirty-five lawyers came from Vermont: M. E.
Ames, L. M. Brown, j. M. Gilman, H. A. Billings, R. B. Galusha,
T. S. Buckham, and G. W. Batchelder. Five came from Pennsylvania: W. Hollinshead, H. J. Horn, Harvey Officer, and the two
men who filled out the unfinished terms of Judges Atwater and
Flandrau,--S. J. R. McMillan and Thomas Wilson. From New
Hampshire came J. B. Sanborn, Morris Lamprey, and D. A.
Secombe. W. Sprigg Hall and D. Cooper were from Maryland;
G. E. Cole and J. Severance from Massachusetts; and M. Sherburne from Maine. "
COMPARISON OF THE CODES

By the great number of cases depending upon New York
precedents, and by the fact that the New York cases were almost
the only authorities for precedents under the new code pleading,
it is indisputable that the Minnesota statutes in point were largely
modelled after the similar statutes of New York. In the opinion
in the case of Greenleaf v. Edes, Judge Atwater wrote the follow70
ing:
"In view of the fact that our code is mostly a transcript from
that of New York, and of the advantage to be derived to the profession, as well as to the community at large, from the decisions
of the eminent court of last resort of that state, we should long
hesitate to differ from a unanimous opinion of that court given
upon a point involving the construction of the same statute as our
own. In all such cases, it is believed that far less evil would result
from applying the rule of 'stare decisis,' even in every instance,
rather than regard such decisions as open for discussion, and not
'binding upon this court."
Again, Judge Flandrau, in the opinion for Whitaker v. Rice,
wrote :71

"The groundwork of our code was that of New York, much
of it is merely a transcript; therefore, wherever we find alterations,
we must suppose them to be the work of particular design."
69

Two of the judges treated in this paper, Judges Atwater and Flandrau, had practiced in New York before coming to Minnesota, while the
chief justice, Emmett, came from Ohio.

70(1858) 2 Minn. 264, 274.
7- (1864) 9 Minn. 13, 19.
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Reasoning from these and numerous similar statements in the
opinions of the first state supreme court, there can be no doubt
that Minnesota followed the New York Code of Civil Procedure.
It should be remembered that when the New York code was
adopted, the systems of legal and equitable pleading and practice
were united into one system. On the other hand, when the Minnesota code was first adopted, it did not blend the two systems
into one, but retained the court of chancery as a distinct tribunal.
The change introduced by the revised statutes of 1851 applied
only to legal causes of action. By the act approved on March 5,
1853, the court of chancery was abolished, and the two systems
blended. After this enactment, the two civil codes, those of Minnesota and New York, were fundamentally the same.
Not all of the provisions of the act of March 5, 1853, were
incorporated into the proper sections in the 1859 revision, so for
this comparison, the 1866 revised statutes suffice. The only difference between the 1859 and the 1866 revisions, as noted before,
is that the latter work is more complete, and has the phraseology
changed in a number of instances, also including the minor amendments up to that time. But as regards the basic provisions, the
two are essentially the same.
Section 69, page 501, of the 1859 New York Revised Statutes,
volume 3, reads:
"The distinction between actions at law and suits in equity,
and the forms of all such actions and suits, heretofore existing,
are abolished; and there shall be in this state hereafter but one
form of action for the enforcement of protection of private rights
and the redress of private wrongs, which shall be denominated a
civil action."
The similar section of the Minnesota Revised Statutes for 1866,
reads :7
"The distinction between actions at law, and suits in equity
and the forms of all such actions and suits, are abolished; and
there shall be in this state, but one form of action, for the enforcement or protection of private rights, and the redress of private
wrongs; which shall be called a civil action."
This comparison will follow the outline of the basic changes
introduced by the New York code: (1) abolition of the distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity, and of the forms
of legal actions; (2) the theory of parties; (3) the changes in
72Minn. Rev. St. 1866, sec. 1, pp. 516-17.
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the general rules of pleading. The New York code said of the
parties: "The party complaining shall be known as the plaintiff,
and the adverse party as the defendant." The 1866 revision of
the Minnesota statutes, contained a clause with exactly the same
wording.
The conditions under which the defendant may demur, are
precisely the same in both codes.7 3 In regard to the sections governing the reply, the only difference is in the time limit prescribed.7 - The sections applying to mistakes in pleading and to
amendments are substantially the same.75
Of more interest are the sections telling how the complaint
should be stated. The New York code specified that: "The complaint shall contain a plain and concise statement of the facts
constituting a cause of action without unnecessary repetition.""
The complaint had to contain the title of the action, the court in
which the action was originally brought, the names of the parties,
and a demand of the relief to which the plaintiff considered himself
entitled. The Minnesota 1866 revision included a clause exactly
like the one quoted above from the 1859 New York revised statutes. 7
The earlier Minnesota revision, of 1859, however, contained the following section :78
"The complaint must contain a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action; in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended."
This clause contained a key to the reasons for the change in
the legal system of procedure. The purpose of the code framers
was to simplify pleadings and practice, even "that every man
might be his own lawyer." The phrase "in such a manner as to
enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended," was accepted by contemporary lawyers as the test of
what was demanded. A plain and easily intelligible argument was
desired, to replace the highly technical and largely fictitious pleas
used under the common law system, where even the literary classics
were referred to if legal precedents were lacking or not easily
79
available.
733 N. Y. Rev. St. 1859, p. 144. 2 Minn. Rev. St. 1866, pp. 459-60.
743 N. Y. Rev. St. 1859, p. 518-19; Minn. Rev. St. 1866 p. 461.
753 N. Y. Rev. St. 1859, p.522-23; Minn. Rev. St. 1866, pp. 463-64.
7
7 6N.Y. Code Civ. Proc. 1859, sec. 142 (2), p. 516.
7Minn. Rev. St. 1866, sec. 73 (2), p. 459.
7
-Minn. ReV. St. 1859, sec. 64 (2) p. 540.
79
From an interview with T. S. Buckham.
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STATE LIBRARY

The state library of that period seems to call for some comment. It is impossible to speak accurately of the library as a
whole, as it was at that time, because the first catalogues and the
majority of the reports have been lost, or destroyed by the 1881
capitol fire. No report is available today giving accurate information of the library as a whole. Mention has been made of it.
however, in some discussions, and from interviews, more information has been gathered.
To treat of only one report, that for the year ending December
23, 1859, as given in the appendix of the 1859-1860 senate journal,
is taken as the basis for the following statistics. This report gives
the number and volumes of reports, laws, legislative journals, and
executive documents received in that year, and also some figures on
the condition of certain sets of books. Such publications were received from 31 states, 2 territories (Utah and Washington), the
federal government, and from England, to the total of 529 volumes.
These additions included 80 separate volumes of New York reports, 70 from Pennsylvania, 60 from Massachusetts, and 38 from
Kentucky. The library also had at that time 56 out of 59 volumes
of a set of English common law reports, 20 volumes of a set of
30 volumes of English chancery reports, 41 volumes of a general
"English law library," and 67 miscellaneous law books, of both
English and American origin. As stated above, the total number
of reports, statutes, executive documents, and legislative journals
cannot be ascertained. The library at that time also included miscellaneous classics, including 187 volumes of the "family library,"
Harper's classical literature, and volumes on poetry, drama, fiction,
medical treatises, works on science, and newspapers. Originally
the library was composed of only a small shelf of miscellaneous
books, and apparently visiting lawyers either neglected to return
borrowed volumes, or else took them as souvenirs. For a number
of years no satisfactory system was arranged, and it was next to
impossible for the librarian, for there was such an official all the
while, to keep track of the borrowed volumes and have them
returned.
From the number of volumes received during 1859, one would
naturally believe that there was a considerable collection of worthy
legal reference books in the state library, but the actual condition
seems to have been otherwise. The Honorable Thomas Scott
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Buckham stated in an interview that the majority of the books
there were not law books, that the room was disorderly looking,
and could hardly have been called a library, as it was not properly
taken care of. Judge Atwater, in later years, wrote the following :80

"There was at that time no law library for the use of the
judges, and we were necessarily much hampered in our work by
the lack of that facility. Often we would have brief references to
decisions which might be of controlling weight upon a case under
consideration, but it was impossible for us to obtain any full report
of those decisions. Many cases came before us, especially in real
estate and railroad law, which were of first impression, and we
were obliged to struggle with the questions presented with practically no aid from the textbooks or prior decisions."
CONCLUSION

This period, 1858 to 1866, was a most critical one in Minnesota's -history. Scarcely was the state governmental system inaugurated when the Civil War started. The political and economic status of the state was not fixed. The close elections of
1859 and 1860, installing a Republican party government, indicated a transition period in politics.
And we were "floundering in an economic morass as a result
of an injudicious attempt to build railroads without money, of an
orgy of wildcat banking, and of the depression following the panic
of 1857." a In the midst of the Civil War, Minnesota had to deal
with a series of serious Indian uprisings. Because the federal
government was too much preoccupied with the Civil War, the
state government had to meet the situation as well as it could.
Indeed, Minnesota was more concerned at the time with the Indian
troubles at home than with the war for the Union. This, briefly,
indicates the unsettled conditions of the period covered in this
paper.
-It is difficult to evaluate with any degree of precision the
work of the first state supreme court. To be sure, Minnesota, as
a territory, had enjoyed a territorial supreme court. But this
group had handed down only a small number of decisions, and
its court records were largely lost. With the installation of the
state government, the governmental system was better organized,
and the people had easier access to the courts, which became used
8089 Minn. xxnc.
81S. J. Buck, 2 Folwell. History of Minnesota vir.
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more and more as fundamental doctrines of law had to be enunciated governing commercial life.
This fact is particularly noticeable concerning the court's
work, that the questions were largely either of a commercial nature, or else questions of adjective or procedural law. But few
constitutional questions were presented to this court for settlement. The cases involving governmental questions were small in
number, and were occupied chiefly with municipal powers and
county officers. Commercial law, on the other hand, demanded
more immediate settlement. The judges treated in this paper occupied the bench in Minnesota's formative years, when men werc
concerned largely with commerce and real estate and railroads.
These fields of law were necessarily unsettled at that time, and
the Minnesota supreme court had the task of selecting fundamental principles from the numerous and varying practices of the
older states, and building a consistent body of practice and law
in Minnesota. Individuals may disagree as to the individual worth
of the judges, but all must agree that as a group they performed
their work well, in laying down the basis for the commercial laws
of the state.
As above noted, the court was also largely occupied with settling questions of procedure, or difficulties in adjective law. This
paper has outlined the introduction and the essential elements of
the code of civil procedure which Minnesota adapted from that
used in the state of New York. The chief purpose of adopting
this system was to simplify the legal machinery, and do away
with the fictions, the unnecessarily elaborate and formal petitions
evolved by the common law practice. This hope, however, was
not realized in the lifetime of -these judges. The newer system,
designed to simplify proceedings, did away with some of the
faults of the older system, but also raised new difficulties. Atwater wrote:
"The only immediate result was, that the new system, for
many years, became an inextricable muddle of incongruities, imposing greatly increased labor on the judiciary and from which
it has not yet been wholly rescued." 82
The same judge, in a judicial opinion, wrote the following:
"Correct pleading under the code is, perhaps, more difficult

,83
than under the old system. ...
823 Magazine of Western History 655.
83
Barnsback v. Reiner, (1866) 8 Minn. 59, 66.
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Inspection of code state reports and comparison with those
of the common law states will show that there is much more litigation over questions of pleading in code states. This may be
ascribed to several reasons: because of the comparative newness
of the code system, because of inherent difficulties, and in some
part because of the reluctance of various courts to give full force
and effect to the changes introduced by it.
Immediately' following the introduction of the code system,
there developed two schools of thought regarding its position.
The first contended that it formed a system complete in itself,
and was sufficient in itself without reference to any principles
which had been developed by the older system of procedure. The
other group advanced the doctrine that the primary object of all
pleading was the same, and in view of the great difficulty of a
sudden and complete abandonment of the rules developed by common law and equity practice, they freely referred to the older
system where necessary. In fact, many of the code statutes made
provision for referring to the older systems where the newer procedure was incomplete or too-uncertain. This last view was taken by the great majority of the code states, including Minnesota. 8 '
It may be true that direct references to common law and equity
pleading may not be numerous today, but in the early development
of the code practice, the older systems were directly referred to
again and again in the building up of a code system completely to
cover the field.
Judges Emmett, Atwater, and Flandrau did their best to give
the code system a fair chance, and saw to it that its provisions
were complied with, in the face of rather bitter and continued opposition. They carried this work on so well, that, as continued
by their successors, the code system of civil procedure has remained a part of Minnesota legal procedure.
Emmett, the chief justice, was an extremely sociable man, but
not a steady worker. Although generally recognized as talented,
and blessed with a keen mind, he did not make the most of his
opportunities. His record as chief justice proved that he was an
able judge, capable of reasoning soundly even where legal precedent was lacking. In the formal in memoriam services held in
the state supreme court in memory of Lafayette Emmett, Thomas
Wilson said the following of the chief justice of Minnesota's first
state supreme court :85
s 4State v. Pulle, (1866) 12 Minn. 164.
8597 Minn. xxvm.
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"He was a man of a great deal more than ordinary ability;
a man of very exceptional attractive characteristics and personality. The only comment adverse to Judge Emmett that could
be made would be that he was a little inclined to be indolent. Had
he done his best he would have been a man of mark. .. ."
*

. .

The later achievements of Judges Atwater and Flandrau do
not need elaboration. They were not only brilliant men, but also
industrious, and have left enviable records of varied but worthy
contributions to Minnesota's progress.
In this paper have been gathered the various threads that
would include all of the factors influencing the judiciary of the
period treated, including biographical, historical, and the relevant
notes of Minnesota's legal history. This study might have been
named a "study of the factors influencing a pioneer judiciary," a
study of the conditions under which Minnesota's first state supreme court labored.
"Of all men that distinguish themselves by memorable achievements, the first place of honor seems due to . . . the founders
of states who transmit a system of laws and institutions to secure
the peace, happiness, and liberty of future generations."

